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NOTES
Burnham v. Superior Court: The Supreme Court Agrees on
Transient Jurisdiction in Practice, But Not in Theory
As any survivor of a law school course in civil procedure can attest, Pen-
noyer v. Neff 1 dominates the subject of personal jurisdiction. Not only did that
decision render a state's assertion of jurisdiction a constitutional matter, but it
also created jurisdictional standards that remained unchallenged for a century.
Not until 1977, in Shaffer v. Heitner,2 did the United States Supreme Court hold
that one of the Pennoyer bases, presence of property in the forum state, is alone
insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. The Shaffer Court held that the min-
imum-contacts test, first enunciated in International Shoe Company v. Washing-
ton 3 as a new formulation of jurisdictional due process, also must be satisfied. 4
Following Shaffer, many commentators hypothesized that minimum-contacts
analysis also might have superseded Pennoyer's other basis for jurisdiction-
presence of the defendant in the forum state-rendering the latter of little more
than historical interest. 5 Some lower courts agreed and refused to find jurisdic-
tion based on presence in the forum state solely.6
After twelve years of uncertainty, the Court finally addressed the status of
"transient" or "tag" jurisdiction in the post-Shaffer era in Burnham v. Superior
Court.7 All nine Justices voted to affirm jurisdiction on the Burnham facts, but
eight of them split into two widely divergent camps. One camp maintained that
1. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
2. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
3. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212. The minimum-contacts test consists of a two-part inquiry: A
court first must establish that a sufficient level of defendant-initiated contact with the forum seeking
jurisdiction exists; then, if the contacts exist, the court must consider whether allowing jurisdiction
would comport with "'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe,
326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). See infra notes 74-92 and
accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of the minimum-contacts test.
5. Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: 4 Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of In Personam
Jurisdiction?, 25 VILL. L. REv. 38, 52-60 (1979); Brilmayer, Haverkamp, Logan, Lynch, Neuwirth
& O'Brien, A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEx. L. REv. 723, 748-55 (1988); Casad,
Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdiction Theory?, 26 U. KAN. L. REv. 61, 77
(1977); Fyr, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Supreme Court's Latest Last Words on State Court Jurisdiction,
26 EMORY L.J. 739, 770-73 (1977); Posnak, 4 Uniform Approach to Judicial Jurisdiction After
World-Wide and the Abolition of the "Gotcha" Theory, 30 EMORY L.J. 729, 742-43 (1981); Silber-
man, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 75-76 (1978); Vernon, Single-
Factor Bases of In Personam Jurisdiction-A Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978
WASH. U.L.Q. 273, 302-03 (1978); Werner, Dropping the Other Shoe: Shaffer v. Heitner and the
Demise of Presence Oriented Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 565, 588-90 (1979). See infra notes
103-06 and accompanying text for further discussion of the scholarly reaction to Shaffer.
6. See, eg., Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress of the U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42, 45-48 (3d Cir. 1985);
Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software, Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 305, 312 (N.D. Il. 1986); Schrei-
ber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1079, 1089 (D. Kan. 1978) (alternative holding), rev'd on
other grounds, 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979); Duehring v. Vasquez, 490 So. 2d 667, 671 (La. App.
1986); Bershaw v. Sarbacher, 40 Wash. App. 653, 655, 700 P.2d 347, 349 (1985). See infra notes
107-17 and accompanying text for further discussion of the Harold M. Pitman and Schreiber cases.
7. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990). "Transient jurisdiction" refers to a state's assertion of jurisdiction
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Shaffer had no effect on the doctrine of transient jurisdiction and that the Pen-
noyer formulation remains viable;s the other camp reasoned that Shaffer re-
quires applying the minimum-contacts test, but found that presence itself
satisfied the test and conferred jurisdiction.9 Neither of these two factions
formed a majority; therefore, the theory of transient jurisdiction remains un-
clear. While the legal rationales for jurisdiction based on in-forum service re-
main in dispute, however, service of process, during even a fleeting presence in a
forum, probably still will allow a state to assert jurisdiction.
This Note examines the reasoning of the opposing positions adopted by the
Burnham Justices, describes the Court's past treatment of personal jurisdiction,
and analyzes the former in light of the latter. It concludes that, although Shaffer
did not explicitly compel the application of minimum-contacts analysis to juris-
diction based on presence of the defendant in the forum state, the holding does
provide a justification for doing so. Furthermore, the Note contends that the
Court's emphasis on fairness as a determinant of due process during the past
forty-five years and the unfairness that can result from transient jurisdiction sug-
gest that the Court should abolish the practice. The Note also finds that the
Justices who favored replacing transient jurisdiction with the minimum-contacts
test applied that test in a faulty manner, giving far too much weight to presence
in the forum state as a contact. Although presence is a contact worthy of analy-
sis, courts should not give it such balance-tipping consideration.
Dennis Burnham and Francie Burnham were married in 1976 and lived
together in New Jersey from 1977 until July 1987, when the couple separated
and Francie moved to California with their two children.10 The couple entered
into a separation agreement before Francie left, but the following October Den-
nis filed for divorce in New Jersey state court.11 He did not serve process on
Francie, however, and in January, 1988, she filed her own action in California, 12
seeking not only a divorce, but also a determination of marital property rights,
spousal support, and custody of the children. 13 Dennis traveled to California
shortly after Francie filed suit, both to conduct business and to visit his chil-
dren.14 While at his wife's home, he received a summons and a copy of
over an individual on the grounds that she received service of process while within that state's
borders.
8. Id. at 2109-17.
9. Id. at 2120-26 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Stevens joined neither faction,
apparently basing his vote to affirm jurisdiction on the rationales of both sides. See infra note 68.
10. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 3, Burnham (No. 89-44). A state may acquire jurisdic-
tion to determine marital status if it is the domicile of one of the spouses. Williams v. North Caro-
lina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942). To determine property rights incident to the marriage, however, a
state must acquire in personam jurisdiction over the defendant or quasi in rem jurisdiction over the
property affected. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418-19 (1957). Similarly, a court must
have in personama jurisdiction over the defendant to determine alimony or child custody. Baldwin v.
Baldwin, 28 Cal. 2d 406, 415-16, 170 P.2d 670, 676 (1946) (alimony); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S.
528, 533-34 (1953) (child custody).
14. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 4, Burham (No. 89-44).
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Francie's divorce petition. 15
Dennis made a special appearance in California Superior Court, where he
moved to quash the service of process on the grounds that the court lacked
personal jurisdiction over him. 16 The court initially granted his request.17 On
reconsideration, however, it denied the motion to quash in its entirety.18 The
California Court of Appeal denied Dennis's request for mandamus relief on the
grounds that personal presence in the forum state continues to be a "valid juris-
dictional predicate for in personam jurisdiction."1 9 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari, 20 and on May 29, 1990, unanimously affirmed
jurisdiction. 1
Although the Justices voted unanimously in favor of jurisdiction, they
adopted two radically different rationales for their holding. Justice Scalia wrote
the opinion of the Court,22 while Justice Brennan wrote an opinion concurring
in the judgment.2 3 Neither of the two primary factions restricted its holding to
the facts at hand; instead, both sides took expansive positions on the issue.24
Justice Scalia began his opinion for the Court by noting that transient juris-
diction is "[a]mong the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdic-
tion in American tradition. '25 He traced the historical development of the
doctrine from Roman origins through English common law.2 6 While conceding
that scholars have questioned the degree to which English tradition in fact em-
braced transient jurisdiction,27 he asserted that when the fourteenth amendment
15. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109.
16. Id. Dennis argued that due process was not satisfied, as he had insufficient contacts with
the state for its assertion of jurisdiction. Id.
17. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 5, Burnham (No. 89-44). The order nominally denied
Dennis Burrham's motion to quash, but in effect granted his request because it stated that the court
had "no personal jurisdiction.., over any other issue except marital status." Id.
18. Id. at 6. The court reversed itself after a hearing at which Francie Burnham argued both
that in-forum service was a proper basis for jurisdiction and that her husband had sufficient contacts
with the state to satisfy the minimum-contacts test. Id.
19. Burnham, 110 S. CL at 2109 (citation omitted).
20. 110 S. Ct. 47 (1989).
21. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2105.
22. Id. at 2109-19. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined Justice Scalia. Justice
White filed an opinion concurring in part with the opinion of the Court and concurring in the
judgment. Id. at 2119-20 (White, J., concurring in part and in judgment).
23. Id. at 2120-26 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
O'Connor joined Justice Brennan. Justice Stevens wrote a brief opinion concurring in the judgment.
Id. at 2126 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
24. Both plaintiff and defendant suggested at oral arguments that the Court could take a nar-
row approach. For a description of these arguments, see Arguments Before the Court, 58 U.S.L.W.
3585, 3585-86 (1990). Dennis's attorney reasoned that "if the court were to determine that Pennoyer
should not be abolished, then it should not apply in a situation such as this, where a father is visiting
his children." Id. at 3586. Francie's attorney suggested that while transient jurisdiction may not
always lead to fair results, it would be appropriate in this instance. Id.
25. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2110.
26. Id. at 2110-11.
27. Id; see, eg., Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth
and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 297 (1956) ("English legal history furnishes little support
for the power doctrine."); Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv.
241, 253 ("[l]t would appear that, until 1830, there was no developed English common law on what
we now call interstate or international jurisdiction.").
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was adopted, 28 American courts accepted without question the concept of juris-
diction based on presence.29 Furthermore, that acceptance has continued until
the present, with the exception of a few decisions after Shaffer that, Justice
Scalia claimed, "erroneously" held that transient jurisdiction violates due pro-
cess. 30 Justice Scalia said he did "not know of a single State or federal statute,
or a single judicial decision resting upon State law, that has abandoned in-State
service as a basis of jurisdiction. '3 1 He argued that transient jurisdiction has
become so well established that it now automatically satisfies due process, stat-
ing "'[that which], in substance, has been immemorially the actual law of the
land... therefor[e] is due process of law.' ",32
Turning to the minimum-contacts theory of personal jurisdiction-but
leaving aside Shaffer for the moment-Justice Scalia refuted the suggestion that
this relatively new theory should displace the traditional Pennoyer "power" for-
mulation in the context of transient jurisdiction.33 He emphasized that the
Court developed the minimum-contacts analysis as a way of addressing weak-
nesses in the Pennoyer rule which courts previously had resolved within the Pen-
noyer framework through the fictions of "consent" and "presence."134 He noted
that "[o]ur opinion in International Shoe cast those fictions aside, and made
explicit the underlying basis of these decisions: due process does not necessarily
require the States to adhere to the unbending territorial limits on jurisdiction set
forth in Pennoyer."' 35 The minimum-contacts test serves only to supplement
Pennoyer, according to Justice Scalia; it provides no basis for the proposition
that presence in a forum not only is no longer necessary to confer jurisdiction,
but also is no longer sufficient on its own to do so. 36 Thus, Justice Scalia con-
cluded, both the status of transient jurisdiction as a tradition and the nature of
minimum-contacts analysis as a mere adjunct to the Pennoyer rules militate
against overturning the practice:
The short of the matter is that jurisdiction based on physical presence
alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing tradi-
tions of our legal system that define the due process standard of "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice." That standard was
developed by analogy to "physical presence," and it would be perverse
to say it could now be turned against that touchstone of jurisdiction.37
Justice Scalia next discussed the argument that Shaffer requires minimum-
28. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2111. Justice Scalia called the moment of adoption "the crucial
time for present purposes," id., presumably because acceptance of the doctrine in the past confers
legitimacy upon it now. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
29. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2111.
30. Id. at 2113; see infra notes 107-17 and accompanying text.
31. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2113.
32. Id. at 2115 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528 (1884)).
33. Id. at 2114-15.
34. Id. at 2114. See infra note 73 for a discussion of the use of fictions in personal jurisdiction.
35. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2114.
36. Id. at 2115.
37. Id.
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contacts analysis even in situations when service occurs within the forum. 3 8
Shaffer's application of the minimum-contacts test to in rem and quasi in rem
jurisdiction39-jurisdiction sanctioned by Pennoyer-and its statement that "all
assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the stan-
dards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny," 4 do not, Justice Scalia
argued, invalidate transient jurisdiction. Shaffer, like all cases the Court has
heard since International Shoe, concerned a state's effort to obtain jurisdiction
over an absent defendant.4 1 Its holding simply "places all suits against absent
nonresidents on the same constitutional footing, regardless of whether a separate
Latin label is attached to one particular basis of contact [and] does not compel
the conclusion that physically present defendants must be treated identically to
absent ones." 4 2 Thus, Justice Scalia argued, Shaffer's significance is not that it
overruled one of Pennoyer's fundamental bases of personal jurisdiction; rather, it
simply conferred the same jurisdictional treatment on out-of-state defendants
who own property in the forum state as that given to out-of-state defendants
who do not own property in the forum state.
Justice Scalia acknowledged Shaffer's statement that "'traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice' can be as readily offended by the perpetuation
of ancient forms that are no longer justified as by the adoption of new proce-
dures that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heri-
tage."' 43 He insisted, however, that it would be impossible for a practice which is
"both firmly approved by tradition and still favored"44-transient jurisdiction-
to be "no longer justified."'45
Finally, Justice Scalia criticized the minimum-contacts approach advocated
in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion.46 Abandoning the Pennoyer rule and
38. Id. at 2115-16. Justice White did not join in this section of the Court's opinion.
39. In rem jurisdiction refers to a court's authority to determine rights to property within the
forum as to the entire world; for example, to hear a condemnation suit. Quasi in rem jurisdiction
describes two distinct judicial capacities. One is a court's power to resolve competing claims on
property in the forum held by the litigating parties; for example, a suit to compel specific perform-
ance of a contract to convey real estate. The other is a court's ability, in the absence of in personam
jurisdiction over a defendant, to attach the defendant's property in the forum and render a judgment
up to the property's value. J. FRIEDENTrHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.8, at
114-16 (1985).
40. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
41. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2110 ("Since International Shoe, we have only been called upon to
decide whether these 'traditional notions' [of fair play and substantial justice] peimit States to exer-
cise jurisdiction over absent defendants in a manner that deviates from the rules of jurisdiction ap-
plied in the 19th century.").
42. Id. at 2116.
43. Id. (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2117-19. Justice Brennan argued first that the Shaffer holding compels the conclu-
sion that minimum-contacts analysis should apply to all assertions of jurisdiction. Id. at 2120-22
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); see infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. He then ap-
plied a minimum-contacts analysis to presence in the forum state. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2122-26
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); see infra notes 58-68 and accompanying text. He concluded
that presence in the forum state is a sufficiently weighty contact to allow jurisdiction because by
visiting a state a defendant avails herself of its benefits and services and because the defendant has
access to the state's courts as a plaintiff. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2124-25 (Brennan, J., concurring in
judgment). Furthermore, Justice Brennan found that considerations of fairness to the defendant
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requiring minimum contacts of even those served while in the forum state, Jus-
tice Scalia argued, would establish not "a rule of law at all, but only a 'totality of
the circumstances' test, guaranteeing what traditional territorial rules of juris-
diction were designed specifically to avoid: uncertainty and litigation over the
preliminary issue of the forum's competence."4 7 Moreover, he continued, ap-
plying the minimum-contacts test in as liberal a manner as Justice Brennan ad-
vocated would lead to anomalous results. The benefits obtained in a three-day
trip such as that in Burnham "strike us as powerfully inadequate to establish, as
an abstract matter, that it is 'fair' for California to decree the ownership of all
Mr. Burnham's worldly goods acquired during the ten years of his marriage, and
the custody over his children."'4 8 The arguments that a transient defendant has
access to the forum's courts as a plaintiff and that defending a foreign suit would
not be burdensome "juitify the exercise of jurisdiction over everyone, whether or
not he ever comes to California." 49 Thus, Justice Scalia argued,
[t]he only "fairness" elements setting Mr. Burnham apart from the rest
of the world are the three-days' "benefits"... and even those, do not
set him apart from many other people who have enjoyed three days in
the Golden State... but who were fortunate enough not to be served
with process while they were there and thus are not (simply by reason
of that savoring) subject to the general jurisdiction of California's
courts.
50
Under Justice Brennan's formulation, according to Justice Scalia, allowing
jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the accepted minimum-contacts test. To
find that Burnham's presence in the forum state by itself was a sufficient contact
for the assertion of general jurisdiction 51 under minimum-contacts analysis
would require the conclusion that the state could have asserted general jurisdic-
tion over him even if he had not received service of process while there, but had
obtained notice of the suit in some other manner-a proposition "which we
know does not conform with 'contemporary notions of due process.' ",52
In contrast to the opinion of the Court, Justice Brennan's concurring opin-
ion53 accepted the proposition that Shaffer requires application of the minimum-
contacts test even when service occurs within the forum state. Justice Brennan
support jurisdiction for the following reasons: Presence-based jurisdiction comports with reasonable
expectations, travel today is easy and inexpensive, and procedural devices exist to lighten the burden
of defending in a foreign forum. Id. at 2125 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
47. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2119.
48. Id. at 2117.
49. Id.
50. Id. (citation omitted).
51. "General jurisdiction" is a court's ability to assert personal jurisdiction regardless of the
relationship between the cause of action and the defendant's activities in, or affecting, the forum
state. In contrast, "specific jurisdiction" is the power to assert jurisdiction in claims arising out of
activities that occur in the forum state or that have a direct effect there. The Court has acknowl-
edged that a defendant's contacts with the forum state must be more systematic when a court is
seeking to exercise general jurisdiction rather than specific. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom-
bia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8-9 (1984); see also infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text(further discussion of the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction).
52. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2118.
53. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
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interpreted this requirement as arising both from Shaffer's explicit language-
"all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the
standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny" 54-and from the na-
ture of the Shaffer decision itself. In throwing out quasi in rem jurisdiction, a
doctrine "dutifully accepted by American courts for at least a century,"" s the
Shaffer Court established that a practice's "pedigree" should not determine its
present-day status, Justice Brennan argued.5 6 Thus, he continued, "[i]f we
could discard an 'ancient form without substantial modem justification' in Shaf-
fer, we can do so again."57
Justice Brennan proceeded to analyze the application of the minimum-con-
tacts test to instances in which a defendant is present in the forum state.5 8 He
identified two factors relating to a defendant's contacts with the forum-avail-
ment of state services and the ability to sue in state courts-and three factors
relating to the general fairness of jurisdiction based on the "contact" of pres-
ence-reasonable expectations, the ease of travel and communication, and the
availability of cost-cutting procedural devices. 59 From these factors, Justice
Brennan concluded that "as a rule the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
defendant based on his voluntary presence in the forum will satisfy the require-
ments of due process." 6
On the issue of contacts, Justice Brennan argued that in most instances a
defendant's presence within a forum state is itself a sufficient availment of bene-
fits to satisfy the minimum-contacts test.61 Availment occurs in that the defend-
ant's "health and safety are guaranteed by the State's police, fire and emergency
medical services; he is free to travel on the State's roads and watelvays; he likely
enjoys the fruits of the State's economy as well." 62 Contact also occurs in that a
defendant constitutionally is guaranteed the right of access to the forum's
courts: "[w]ithout transient jurisdiction, an asymmetry would arise: a transient
would have the full benefit of the power of the forum State's courts as a plaintiff
while retaining immunity from their authority as a defendant." 63
On the issue of the general fairness of presence-based jurisdiction, Justice
Brennan argued that three elements reduce the possibility of unfair and burden-
some results for a defendant. First, the practice has a long history of acceptance
in the courts. Although this tradition does not mean that transient jurisdiction
therefore must comport with due process, it raises "a strong presumption" that
54. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212
(1977) (emphasis added by Burnham Court)).
55. Id. at 2121 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
56. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
57. Id. at 2122 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
58. Id. at 2122-26 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
59. Id. at 2124-25 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). For a description of the minimum-
contacts test and its two stages, see supra note 4 and infra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
60. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2125 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
61. Id. at 2124-25 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
62. Id. at 2125 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
63. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
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it doesA4 Second, modem communication and transportation lessen the costs of
defending a suit in a foreign forum. 65 Moreover, "[t]hat the defendant has al-
ready journeyed at least once before to the forum... is an indication that suit in
the forum likely would not be prohibitively inconvenient. ' 66 Finally, procedural
devices exist that can lessen the burden of defending the foreign action, such as
discovery by mail or telephone, motions to dismiss, and the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. 67 Thus, Justice Brennan concluded, although Shaffer requires
that all assertions of jurisdiction satisfy the minimum-contacts test, the contacts
arising out of a defendant's presence in the forum state almost always will satisfy
the test.68
Personal jurisdiction in contemporary times has been contoured by a series
of decisions, beginning in 1878 with Pennoyer v. Neff.69 That case had two great
consequences, both of which arose out of dictum.70 One was to require that
state assertions of jurisdiction satisfy the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.71 The other consequence was to enunciate a theory of jurisdiction
that, although later decisions have supplemented it and cast doubt on its vitality,
remains today an important and influential decision-as Burnham itself
illustrates.
64. Id. at 2124 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
65. Id. at 2125 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
66. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
67. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
68. Justice Brennan acknowledged that "there may be cases in which a defendant's involuntary
or unknowing presence in a State does not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him."
Id. at 2124 n. 11 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). He did not discuss specific circumstances
under which a defendant would not have sufficient contacts to meet the minimum-contacts test,
however, because "[the facts of the instant case do not require us to determine the outer limits of the
transient jurisdiction rule." Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
In his concurring opinion, Justice White reaffirmed his conviction that the long history and
wide acceptance of transient jurisdiction forestall a finding that the practice violates due process
"either on its face or as applied in this case." Id. at 2119 (White, J., concurring in part and injudgment). Unlike Justice Scalia, he conceded that the Court "has the authority.., to examine even
traditionally accepted procedures and declare them invalid." Id. (White, J., concurring in part and
in judgment). Justice White argued, however, that only a general showing that the transient jurisdic-
tion rule is sufficiently unfair would justify a finding that the doctrine violates due process. Id. at
2119-20 (WVhite, J., concurring in part and in judgment). In the meantime, he added, "claims in
individual cases that the rule would operate unfairly as applied to the particular non-resident in-
volved need not be entertained." Id. at 2120 (White, J., concurring in part and in judgment).
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment in a short and somewhat enigmatic opinion, stating
that "the historical evidence and consensus identified by Justice Scalia, the considerations of fairness
identified by Justice Brennan, and the common sense displayed by Justice White, all combine to
demonstrate that this is, indeed, a very easy case." Id. at 2126 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
He declined to join either of the two primary opinions out of concern for their "unnecessarily broad
reach." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
69. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
70. At issue in Pennoyer was the validity of what appears to have been a quasi in rem judgment
obtained against an absent defendant. The Court ruled for the defendant on the grounds that the
property serving as the basis for jurisdiction was not attached when the litigation began.. Id. at 728.
Discussion of in personam jurisdiction and due process requirements was unnecessary to the deci-
sion; in fact, the fourteenth amendment had not yet taken effect. See Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and
Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479,
496-500 (1987).
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall... deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law ...."). See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733.
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Pennoyer's "power" theory of jurisdiction was giared around the notion of
states as separate sovereign entities. Justice Field, author of the Court's opinion,
identified two fundamental principles that defined the limits of state jurisdiction:
"every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
property within its territory" and "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and
authority over persons or property without its territory."' 72 These statements
embedded the concept of transient jurisdiction in the American legal system;
whatever the practice's prior degree of acceptance, Pennoyer made it clear that
presence in the forum state was the sole means of securing in personam jurisdic-
tion over a nonconsenting, nonresident defendant. 73
This standard persisted until 1945, when the Court in International Shoe
Company v. Washington 74 tacitly acknowledged that the "power" theory of ju-
risdiction, despite its accompanying fictions, 75 no longer sufficed in an age of
dramatically increased interstate contacts.7 6 The Court ruled that a state could
acquire jurisdiction over a mail-order corporation that solicited shoe sales within
the forum through in-state agents, but whose activities may have failed to reach
the level at which a corporation was deemed to be "doing business" in the fo-
rum.7 7 By allowing the assertion of jurisdiction, the Court cleared the way for
72. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
73. See, eg., McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) ("The foundation of jurisdiction is
physical power.").
The Pennoyer court explicitly recognized two situations beyond the power formulation in which
a state could assert jurisdiction: When the issue is the status of a nonresident toward a citizen of the
forum and when a business organization consents to being subject to the state's jurisdiction. Pen-
noyer, 95 U.S. at 734-36.
In time, the Court developed both of these exceptions to allow jurisdiction over absent individu-
als under certain circumstances. In Milliken v. Meyer, it held that a state may render in personam
judgments against its domiciliaries regardless of whether they are present in the forum. 311 U.S.
457, 462-63 (1940). A more troublesome situation arose when a nonresident defendant's in-forum
activities gave rise to a claim, but the defendant left the forum before being served. The Court
sought to address this problem by allowing states to condition permission to conduct potentially
harmful activities in the forum on obtaining consent-first express, then implied-to jurisdiction
over claims arising from those activities. See Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 167-69 (1916) (state
could require operators of automobiles in the state to consent to jurisdiction for claims arising out of
that activity); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927) (state could infer consent to jurisdiction
by operators of motor vehicles within the state for claims arising from such operation).
Initially, the Court tried to limit the application of this rationale for jurisdiction. See, eg.,
Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289, 293 (1919) (It would be a "mere fiction" for a state to infer that a
foreign unincorporated association consented to jurisdiction by doing business in the forum.). How-
ever, it later granted greater latitude in the use of "consent." See, eg., Henry L. Doherty & Co. v.
Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 627-28 (1935) (state could infer consent to jurisdiction over nonresident
securities seller, partially because of the state's interest in protecting its citizens).
74. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
75. See supra note 73.
76, International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. For the Court's characterization of the effect of in-
creased interstate contacts, see, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958) (citations
omitted):
As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between States, the need for
jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase. At the same time, pro-
gress in communications and transportation has made the defense of a suit in a foreign
tribunal less burdensome. In response to these changes, the requirements for personal ju-
risdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff to the
flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.
77. It appears that the defendant intentionally structured its operations in Washington to avoid
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the state to pursue a claim for payments to an unemployment compensation
fund due of all in-state employers. 78 The Court recharacterized Pennoyer's due
process limitations on personal jurisdiction,79 holding that for a court to acquire
in personam jurisdiction over a defendant, "if he be not present within the terri-
tory of the forum, he [must] have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.' "8
The International Shoe Court linked the level of contacts necessary for ju-
risdiction to the relationship between the activities and the cause of action. If
the suit arises out of in-forum activity, as was the case in International Shoe,81
isolated acts of contact or even a single act might be sufficient. 82 If the suit is
unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the forum, however, the contacts
must constitute "continuous and systematic" activity for the state to assert juris-
diction.83 The Court later acknowledged the terms "specific jurisdiction" and
"general jurisdiction" to describe these two situations. 84
Presence in the forum remained an unchallenged basis for jurisdiction fol-
lowing International Shoe. Indeed, the most notorious assertion of transient ju-
risdiction took place in 1959 when a federal district court upheld jurisdiction
based on service of a defendant while on an airplane flying over the forum
state.85 Some scholars, however, saw International Shoe as potentially supersed-
ing Pennoyer, and questioned the continued vitality of the transient jurisdiction
reaching the level of activity at which "doing business" occurred. It had no office in the state,
supplied its salesmen with only one shoe of a pair offered, and shipped its orders free on board from
the state of Illinois. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313-14. Defendant argued that the Court
had held those activities to be insufficient to constitute presence within the state. Id. at 315-16.
78. Id. at 311-12.
79. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
80. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
81. The state claimed that the company was an in-state employer and thus was obliged to
contribute to the state's unemployment compensation fund. Id. at 311; see supra text accompanying
note 78.
82. InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 318; see, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220, 223 (1957) (state could assert jurisdiction, even though defendant's only contact with the forum
was the issuance of an insurance policy to a forum resident, because the claim arose out of that
policy).
83. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317; see, eg., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342
U.S. 437, 448 (1952) (corporation's use of forum to run a portion of its operations amounted to the
continuous and systematic activity necessary to enable the state to assert jurisdiction on a claim
unrelated to the business conducted in the state).
Courts have held that domicile constitutes contact sufficiently continuous and systematic to
confer general jurisdiction since before International Shoe. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462
(1940). Thus a state may assert jurisdiction over an absent domiciliary regardless of the source of
the claim. Id. at 462-63; see supra note 73 and accompanying text.
84. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8-9 (1984). Spe-
cific jurisdiction allows a court to adjudicate only claims arising out of a defendant's activities within
the forum; general jurisdiction permits a court to hear any claim against the defendant, regardless of
its source. Commentators had analyzed jurisdiction in these terms long before the Court did. Von
Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121,
1136 (1966) (coining the terms nearly 20 years prior to the Court's use of the terms specific and
general jurisdiction).
85. Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Ark. 1959). In Grace, the court stated:
[I]t makes no practical difference whether [the defendant] is traveling at the time on a
plane, or on a bus or train, or in his own car. True, if he is going by plane the duration of
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rule.86
Subsequent cases refined International Shoe's minimum-contacts test. In
Hanson v. Denckla87 the Court distinguished the situation in which a plaintiff
attempts to sue a defendant in the forum in which the claim-generating activities
occurred from that where a plaintiff seeks to sue in a forum of her own choos-
ing.88 The Court held that the focus of the contacts inquiry should be upon the
defendant's conduct; forum ties established by the plaintiff or some other party
should not be considered in determining the sufficiency of contacts:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with
the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality
and nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.89
Although the test set out by the International Shoe Court consisted of a
single consideration of the sufficiency of contacts in light of notions of fair play
and substantial justice, over time the minimum-contacts test evolved into a two-
step inquiry.90 First, the party asserting jurisdiction must establish a certain
level of contacts.9 1 If the requisite contacts exist, the court must then determine
that the assertion of jurisdiction would not violate "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice." At this point a court may consider factors other
than the defendant's contacts with the forum, such as the forum state's interest
his presence in the State will probably be much shorter than if he were availing himself of
some other means of transportation, but that is a difference of degree only, not principle.
Id.
86. See, eg., Ehrenzweig, supra note 27, at 311-12 ("It may well be that in the law of jurisdic-
tion over individuals... a substantial 'minimum contact' will ultimately be the touchstone of per-
missible jurisdiction."); Hazard, supra note 27, at 281 ("Ever since International Shoe, Pennoyer v.
Neff has been eligible for oblivion.... [It is feasible] that all jurisdictional problems [could] be
approached as ones of the existence of minimum contacts between the forum and the transaction in
litigation.").
87. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
88. Id. at 251-52.
89. Id. at 253.
90. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). This case ex-
plicitly adopts the two-step inquiry, with the defendant's contacts as the threshold question:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to liti-
gate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in
applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient location
for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.
Id. at 294.
The Court readdressed its language on federalism in Insurance Corporation of Ireland, Limited
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982) ("It is true we have stated that
the requirement of personal jurisdiction, as applied to state courts, reflects an element of federalism
and the character of state sovereignty vis-a-vis other States.... The restriction on state sovereign
power.., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved
by the Due Process Clause.").
91. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291 (a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist "minimum contacts between the defendant
and the forum State").
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in hearing the case and the plaintiff's and defendant's interests in a convenient
forum.
9 2
The three decades following International Shoe saw states test the limits of
this new basis for jurisdiction by enacting long-arm statutes authorizing jurisdic-
tion based on a variety of acts by an absent defendant. 93 The Court allowed this
activity almost without comment; only in Hanson did it hold an attempted exer-
cise ofjurisdiction violated due process.94 In the period between 1977 and 1980,
however, the Court "broke its silence" 95 and issued four decisions, all invalidat-
ing a state's assertion of jurisdiction.96 All of the cases paid a greater degree of
attention to the concept of fairness to the defendant-a fairness measured by the
degree of nexus between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.97 In its
more recent decisions the Court has defined jurisdictional due process in terms
of the defendant's constitutional interest in not having to litigate in a forum
where she has an insufficient affiliation. 98
One of the "silence-breaking" decisions, Shaffer v. Heitner, carried added
significance for the doctrine of transient jurisdiction because the Court for the
first time used minimum-contacts analysis to replace, instead of merely to sup-
plement, a means of asserting jurisdiction that had been valid under Pennoyer.
In Shaffer, plaintiff brought a shareholder derivative suit in the Delaware Court
of Chancery against a corporation and twenty-eight of its officers and directors.
The plaintiff sought to acquire quasi in rem jurisdiction over the individual de-
fendants by sequestering stock owned by them and, under Delaware law, located
in that state.99
Under the jurisdictional theory of Pennoyer, a court could acquire quasi in
92. Id. at 292.
93. See Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach: A Comment on
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. REV. 407, 407-08
(1980).
94. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
95. Louis, supra note 93, at 408.
96. Id. at 408-09. The decisions were Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978);
and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
97. See, eg., Rush, 444 U.S. at 332 ("The justifications offered in support of... jurisdiction...
shift the focus of the inquiry from the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litiga-
tion... [and make it so that] the plaintiff's contacts with the forum are decisive in determining
whether the defendant's due process rights are violated. Such an approach is forbidden by Interna-
tional Shoe and its progeny."); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 ("The Due Process Clause
... gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure
their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not
render them liable to suit."); Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92 ("IThe California Supreme Court's application
of the minimum-contacts test in this case represents an unwarranted extension of International Shoe
and would, if sustained, sanction a result that is neither fair, just, nor reasonable."); Shaffer, 433 U.S.
at 212 (continued use of jurisdiction founded on presence of property within forum "would serve
only to allow state-court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant.").
98. See, eg., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985) ("The Due Process
Clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a
forum with which he has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties, or relations.' "); Insurance Corp.
of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) ("The personal
jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a re-
striction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.").
99. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 190-92.
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rem jurisdiction over any of the absent defendant's property located in the forum
and then render a judgment for an amount up to the property's value. ° The
Court, however, modified Pennoyer by declaring that a court must apply the
minimum-contacts test even when a defendant owns property in the forum. 101
Acknowledging that even an established practice may violate the "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice," the Court examined in rem and
quasi in rem jurisdiction and concluded that the practices violate due process:
The fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything
but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports
an ancient form without substantial modem justification. Its contin-
ued acceptance would serve only to allow state-court jurisdiction that
is fundamentally unfair to the defendant.
We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court jurisdic-
tion must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in Interna-
tional Shoe and its progeny. 102
In the wake of Shaffer, commentators speculated on the decision's impact
on the other half of Pennoyer's presence-based model-transient jurisdiction.103
Some concluded that the great weight the Shaffer Court placed upon fairness to
defendants at least implicitly required that minimum-contacts analysis apply
even when a defendant is served within the forum. 104 Others reserved judgment
on Shaffer's effect.10 5 Most, however, agreed that if the reasoning of Shaffer
were to extend to transient jurisdiction, the doctrine would not survive. Profes-
sor David Vernon, for example, argued:
The single factor of the defendant's transient presence in the forum
contributes nothing more than the presence of the defendant's property
in the forum contributes to the existence of a forum interest in the
outcome, the convenience of the forum as a place to litigate, or a rea-
son for defendant to anticipate suit there. Because it was unfair to
assert jurisdiction in Shaffer, it is unfair to assert jurisdiction in the
transient defendant case. 106
100. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877).
101. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212.
102. Id.
103. See supra note 5.
104. See, eg., Casad, supra note 5, at 77 ("A majority [of the Shaffer Court] apparently [is]
willing to declare the territorial power theory completely obsolete. Physical presence is no longer
either necessary or sufficient for in personam actions or for in rem actions."); Posnak, supra note 5,
at 743 ("[G]iven the Court's emphasis upon fairness, substantial justice, and reasonableness in decid-
ing whether other types of assertions of jurisdiction are constitutional... it would be inconsistent
and unlikely for the Court to uphold" the doctrine of transient jurisdiction.); Werner, supra note 5,
at 589 ("[Ihe 'catch as catch can' theory of in personam jurisdiction, based upon the unrelated
physical presence of a defendant within the forum state, is, and should be, entombed along with the
attachment basis of jurisdiction.").
105. See, eg., Bernstine, supra note 5, at 54 ("Mhe scope of the Shaffer decision with respect to
the transient rule remains uncertain."); Brilmayer, Haverkamp, Logan, Lynch, Neuwirth & O'Brien,
supra note 5, at 752 ("The relevance of Shaffer to transient jurisdiction... is not at all clear...");
Vernon, supra note 5, at 294 ("We do not know whether.., the presence of the defendant in the
forum, no matter how transient, remains a sufficient basis for asserting 'broad' jurisdiction.").
106. Vernon, supra note 5, at 303; see also Bernstine, supra note 5, at 54 ("If Shaffer is read
broadly, the transient rule... may already be dead."); Brilmayer, Haverkamp, Logan, Lynch, Neu-
wirth & O'Brien, supra note 5, at 750 ("The key to the current legal status of transient jurisdiction
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Some courts agreed that Shaffer signalled the end of transient jurisdic-
tion.10 7 One of the first to do so was a Kansas district court in Schreiber v. Allis-
Chalmers Corporation.10 8 In Schreiber, plaintiff asserted a products liability
claim which arose in Kansas against a Delaware-chartered corporation head-
quartered in Wisconsin.10 9 To take advantage of a favorable statute of limita-
tions,110 plaintiff filed suit in a Mississippi district court, claiming jurisdiction
because the corporation was registered to do business there and thus was "pres-
ent" in the state. 111 Defendant obtained a change of venue to the Kansas dis-
trict court and there challenged Mississippi's right to assert jurisdiction.1 12 The
Kansas district court held, in language that might apply equally to individuals,
that presence alone was no longer sufficient to confer jurisdiction:
After Shaffer, plaintiff cannot rely solely on the asserted fact of "pres-
ence" to sustain an exercise of jurisdiction in Mississippi, for "physical
presence is no longer either necessary or sufficient for in personam ac-
tions." Rather, the nature and quality of that "presence" must be eval-
uated, with an eye toward the interest of Mississippi in assuming
jurisdiction and providing a forum for this particular action.1 1 3
Similarly, an Illinois district court invalidated an assertion of jurisdiction
against an individual in Harold M. Pitman Company v. Typecraft Software, Lim-
ited.114 In that case, plaintiff sued Typecraft together with its director and
ninety-percent shareholder in his individual capacity. The individual defendant
received service while in the forum state on a three-day business trip.1 15 This
trip, the court found, was "the only affirmative act which arguably connects
[defendant] with Illinois." 116 The court denied that transient jurisdiction still
was a viable doctrine and opted to apply the minimum-contacts test instead.' 1 7
A majority of courts, however, refused to throw out the transient jurisdic-
tion rule absent an express holding to that effect from the Supreme Court.1 18 In
rests with the holdings of [International Shoe] and [Shaffer]."); Fyr, supra note 5, at 770 ("The
contacts formula could rarely be satisfied in this case."); Silberman, supra note 5, at 75 n.236 ("[I]f
the minimum-contacts rule now applies to all types of jurisdiction, the transient presence of an
individual would presumably fail to satisfy that standard.").
107. See supra note 6.
108. 448 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Kan. 1978) (alternative holding), rev'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d
790 (10th Cir. 1979).
109. Id. at 1081.
110. Id.
11. Id. at 1085. The court found that the corporation's Mississippi activities were entirely un-
related to the events out of which the claim arose. Id.
112. Id. at 1082.
113. Id. at 1089 (quoting Casad, supra note 5, at 77) (emphasis supplied by the court).
114. 626 F. Supp 305 (N.D. 111. 1986).
115. Id. at 307.
116. Id. at 313.
117. Id. at 312 ("[Ulnder Shaffer, mere service of process upon a defendant transiently present
in the jurisdiction does not vest a state with personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Personal ser-
vice within the jurisdiction is not the litmus test for proper in personam jurisdiction.").
118. See, eg., Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1985); Opert v.
Schmid, 535 F. Supp. 591, 593-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Aluminal Indus., Inc. v. Newton Commercial
Assocs., 89 F.R.D. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 733-34, 273
S.E.2d 22, 23-24 (1980); Lockert v. Breedlove, 321 N.C. 66, 68-71, 361 S.E.2d 581, 583-85 (1987);
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one of the first post-Shaffer cases, Oxmans" Erwin Meat Company v. Black-
eter,119 the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction over an individual
based on service while in the forum. It rejected the argument that Shaffer af-
fected transient jurisdiction:
In our view the United States Supreme Court has not imposed a "mini-
mum contacts" requirement on a state's assertion of jurisdiction over a
natural person upon whom personal service within the state has been
achieved. Neither International Shoe nor its progeny, including the
recent case of Shaffer v. Heitner, addresses the issue of the constitu-
tionality of the state's exercising jurisdiction based solely on the service
of process upon an individual physically present within state
borders. 120
The court nevertheless considered the defendant's contacts with the forum and
concluded that they were sufficient to assert jurisdiction. 121
In a more recent affirmation of transient jurisdiction, the North Carolina
Supreme Court held in Lockert v. Breedlove 122 that a defendant's level of con-
tacts with a forum is irrelevant when in-forum service occurs. The court stated
that "a close reading of International Shoe and later cases reveals that the
Supreme Court has not abolished the transient rule of jurisdiction.... [R]ather,
it set out an alternative means of establishing personal jurisdiction when the
defendant is 'not present within the territory of the forum.' 123
The American Law Institute reacted to Shaffer by taking an intermediate
position on the question of transient jurisdiction.124 It acknowledged that the
Shaffer Court "rejected the notion that power derived from the mere presence of
a thing in a State will always provide that State with a basis to determine inter-
ests in the thing." 125 Instead of abolishing the doctrine altogether, however, the
Institute amended the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to provide that
presence normally would make jurisdiction proper, but not always: "A state has
power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who is piesent within
its territory unless the individual's relationship is so attenuated as to make the
exercise of jurisdiction unreasonable." 126
Viewed in light of this history, the rationales offered by both of the Burn-
ham camps suffer from inconsistency. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court fails
to recognize the true nature of the jurisdictional due process right as the Court
Oxman's Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d 683, 687-88, 273 N.W.2d 285, 287 (1979); Nutri-
West v. Gibson, 764 P.2d 693, 695 (Wyo. 1988).
119. 86 Wis. 2d 683, 693, 273 N.W.2d 285, 289 (1979).
120. Id. at 687-88, 273 N.W.2d at 287 (citations omitted).
121. Id. at 693-94, 273 N.W.2d at 289-90. The court found that plaintiff's cause of action arose
out of an alleged fraudulent misrepresentation claimed to have been made by defendant while in the
forum, and that the state's long-arm statute provided for jurisdiction under these circumstances. Id.
122. 321 N.C. 66, 361 S.E.2d 581 (1987).
123. Id. at 70, 361 S.E.2d at 584. For a discussion of this case, see Note, Lockert v. Breedlove:
The North Carolina Supreme Court Rejects the Minimum-Contacts Analysis Under the "Transient
Rule" of Jurisdiction, 66 N.C.L. Rv. 1051 (1988).
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28 (1988).
125. Id. comment b.
126. Id. § 28.
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now defines it and disregards the significance of Shaffer as an. assault upon Pen-
noyer's power theory.127 Justice Brennan's method of applying the minimum-
contacts test to the fact of presence in the forum contradicts the Court's prior
treatment of that test. 128
Justice Scalia asserts that a procedure long established and widely adhered
to is constitutionally firm; however, this theory ignores altogether the model of
jurisdictional due process that the Court has crafted during the past fourteen
years. Moreover, his approach fails to meet even the more general test of "fair-
ness" toward the defendant that has supported the Court's approach to personal
jurisdiction since International Shoe.
The Court has defined jurisdictional due process as some minimum connec-
tion between the forum and either the defendant or the litigation.129 In its de-
scription of the question presented, the Burnham Court acknowledged that the
suit was unrelated to Dennis Burnham's activities in California.1 30 This lack of
nexus between forum and litigation means that, to satisfy the Court's jurisdic-
tional model, there must be a significant level of contact between the forum and
the defendant-in the Court's own parlance, a level sufficient to justify the asser-
tion of general jurisdiction.131
One could simply decree that being present in the forum when service of
process occurs is a contact sufficient to confer general jurisdiction, and leave it at
that. Such an approach is conclusory, however, and lacks the degree of atten-
tion to contacts analysis that the Court has paid in the past.13 2 Indeed, presence
127. See infra notes 129-43 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 144-54 and accompanying text.
129. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 205 (1977) ("The relationship among the defendant,
the forum and the litigation... [is] the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction").
130. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109. Dennis Burnham's contacts with the forum, transacting busi-
ness and visiting his children, were unrelated to the cause of action. Id. He did agree to and assist
his wife and children's move to the forum, and may have contributed less to his family because of the
move; however, the Supreme Court has established that this kind of conduct does not amount to a
purposeful availment of the forum state's benefits and protections. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S.
84, 93-95 (1978). Since there was no relation between the contacts with the forum and the suit, the
Court affirmed general jurisdiction over Dennis Burnham.
131. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
The Court's only detailed examinations of the requirements for general jurisdiction since Inter-
national Shoe have occurred in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
414 (1984), and Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, 342 U.S. 437, 444-49 (1952).
Helicopteros concerned a suit brought in Texas against a Colombian company to recover for
deaths caused by the crash in Peru of a helicopter operated by the defendant. Helicopteros, 466 U.S.
at 409-10. Plaintiff claimed that Texas could assert jurisdiction based on a number of contacts:
defendant had negotiated the contract it was performing at the time of the accident in Texas, it had
purchased the helicopter there, and it had sent its pilots to the state for training. Id. at 410-11. Both
sides conceded that the claim did not arise out of these contacts, so the Court restricted its analysis
to the question of whether the contacts amounted to the continuous and systematic activity neces-
sary to confer general jurisdiction. Id. at 415-16. It concluded they did not. Id. at 416.
In Perkins, the defendant corporation, chartered in the Philippines, ran part of its operations
from Ohio during World War II. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48. The Court held that this amounted to
the continuous and systematic activity necessary to enable Ohio to assert jurisdiction over the com-
pany on a claim unrelated to the business conducted in the state. Id. at 448.
132. See, eg., Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416-18 (considering in turn each contact between the
defendant corporation and the forum, including numerous trips to the forum by officers and
employees).
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in the forum state at the time of service means little as a contact. Further exami-
nation of the facts may reveal that the defendant does have a substantial affilia-
tion with the forum state. Mere presence, however, without regard to the
circumstances surrounding it, logically cannot carry much significance.
13 3
Thus, Justice Scalia's approach is irreconcilable with a due process model that
relies on contacts between the forum state and either the defendant or the
litigation.
Apparently, Justice Scalia is willing to forego the Court's current character-
ization of jurisdictional due process in instances where the defendant is served
within the forum. Even if a special rule should apply in transient jurisdiction
cases, the underlying emphasis on general fairness and reasonableness that the
Court has placed on assertions of jurisdiction 134 demands a finding that tran-
sient jurisdiction in contemporary society meets some standard of "fairness,"
however nebulous. According to Justice Scalia, however, there is no need to
make an "independent inquiry into the desirability or fairness of the prevailing
in-state service rule . . . [because] for our purposes, its validation is its
pedigree." 135
Transient jurisdiction may have been considered a fair practice in the past,
but by concluding that it is fair now, Justice Scalia refused to recognize the
possibility of change. The speed and ease with which one can travel between
states have increased dramatically since the Court first officially sanctioned tran-
sient jurisdiction in Pennoyer; Justice Scalia refused to consider whether this
might have affected the rule's fairness.1 36 States now have a basis on which to
assert jurisdiction, minimum-contacts, that they did not have at the time of Pen-
noyer; however, Justice Scalia refused to examine whether this significant exten-
sion of state authority has affected the fairness of transient jurisdiction, or the
need to accept the unfairnesses it can produce. In short, as Justice Brennan put
it, "Justice Scalia's opinion assumes that there is no further progress to be made
and that the evolution of our legal system, and the society in which it operates,
ended 100 years ago."'
137
Indeed, many scholars agree that transient jurisdiction is generally an un-
fair doctrine, -given its potential for fortuitous and burdensome consequences
upon defendants, and therefore should not persist:
There is virtual unanimity among commentators that jurisdiction
should not necessarily flow from service on the defendant in the forum.
These commentators reached this conclusion primarily because of the
unfairness to the defendant that such assertions of jurisdiction might
entail. These commentators all agreed that grave injustice and gross
133. See Vernon, supra note 5, at 302.03.
134. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
135. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2116.
136. Such changes may make it less burdensome for a defendant to litigate in a foreign forum
than in the past; they also carry the potential, however, for a greater number of fortuitous assertions
of jurisdiction. See, ag., Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (state could
assert jurisdiction over defendant in airplane flying over forum).
137. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2121 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
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unfairness could result from the application of the "Gotcha" theory of
jurisdiction. The forum in which the defendant is served may be so
inconvenient and it may be so costly for him to defend there that in
some cases... it may be prudent for him to default despite a meritori-
ous defense .... In addition, miscarriages of justice are more likely in a
forum that has no relation to the parties, the law to be applied, and the
underlying claims.
138
Justice Scalia's "established tradition" approach also is susceptible to attack
in light of the precedent Shaffer established. The Shaffer Court took a practice
just as venerable and accepted as transient jurisdiction, examined its fairness,
and held that it no longer satisfied due process. 139 Shaffer might not hold ex-
plicitly that jurisdiction based on a defendant's presence be abolished; 140 none-
theless, its premise that "'[t]raditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice' can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are
no longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures," 14 1 forces the conclu-
sion that transient jurisdiction should face the same examination in the light of
contemporary circumstances and perceptions of due process that in rem and
quasi in rem jurisdiction faced. Justice Scalia argues that a long history and
wide acceptance mean a practice still must be justified. Yet, this theory would
have made Shaffer impossible, since in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction had
those qualities to the same degree as transient jurisdiction. 142
Certainly a distinction between presence-based jurisdiction and property-
based jurisdiction exists, in that the Shaffer Court labeled the property-based
jurisdiction to be merely a fiction for jurisdiction over the property's absent
138. Posnak, supra note 5, at 744-45 (footnotes omitted); see also Bernstine, supra note 5, at 62
("[lit is reasonable to argue that the transient rule is unfair to defendants in light of the holdings of
International Shoe and Shaffer."); Brilmayer, Haverkamp, Logan, Lynch, Neuwirth, & O'Brien,
supra note 5, at 749 ("The more modem focus on defendants' rights ... casts doubt upon the
propriety of such naked territorial assertions of jurisdiction [as transient jurisdiction]."); Vernon,
supra note 5, at 303 ("Because it was unfair to assert jurisdiction in Shaffer, it is unfair to assert
jurisdiction in the transient defendant case."); Werner, supra note 5, at 602 ("There should be no
code words such as... 'presence' that automatically result in a finding of jurisdiction without an
evaluation of their significance in the context of the action in which jurisdiction is asserted."). But
see Fyr, supra note 5, at 770-73 (expressing concern that abolishing transient jurisdiction could leave
a plaintiff without a forum under certain circumstances); Maltz, Sovereign Authority, Fairness, and
Personal Jurisdiction: The Case for the Doctrine of Transient Jurisdiction, 66 WASH. U.L.Q. 671,
697-701 (1988) (arguing that transient jurisdiction is consistent with the Court's characterizations of
state sovereignty and that abolishing it would create an asymmetry because a transient defendant
would be immune from jurisdiction while retaining the right to sue in the forum's courts).
139. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
140. The language relied on by Justice Brennan to reach this conclusion, Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at
2120 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment), stated that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction
must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny." Shaf-
fer, 433 U.S. at 212. The standard as originally pronounced in International Shoe, however, required
that "if he be not present within the territory of the forum, [the defendant] have certain minimum-
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (emphasis added). Thus, Shaffer arguably did not
abolish transient jurisdiction explicitly.
141. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212.
142. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2121 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (Before Shaffer,
quasi in rem jurisdiction had been "dutifully accepted by the American courts for at least a
century.").
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owner 14 3 while the presence-based jurisdiction purports to be exactly what it is,
in personam jurisdiction. This difference, however, is relevant only in consider-
ing the fairness of the respective practices, a step Justice Scalia never reached.
Fiction or not, jurisdiction over property was an established tradition when
Shaffer arose. The Shaffer Court held that it could re-examine this tradition.
If one accepts the notion that minimum-contacts analysis should replace
transient jurisdiction, the question arises as to the weight a court should give the
"contact" of presence in the forum. Justice Brennan and those joining in his
concurring opinion took the approach that this contact alone, as a rule, would
be sufficient to confer jurisdiction.144 This position, however, is inconsistent
with the Court's past application of the minimum-contacts test.
By traveling into a state, a defendant avails himself of certain state benefits
and services; obviously this activity is a contact with the forum. Until Burnham,
the Court had never even come close to suggesting that this type of contact is so
significant that it alone could satisfy the minimum-contacts test.14 5 Justice
Brennan, however, inquired into no contacts other than the defendant's presence
and found a sufficient connection between the defendant and the forum state for
general jurisdiction under the minimum-contacts test. Prior to Burnham, for a
state to claim general jurisdiction based on a trip by the defendant to the forum
for purposes unrelated to the cause of action would have been unthinkable, un-
less through the "power" doctrine and transient jurisdiction. Yet, under Justice
Brennan's approach, with the power theory of jurisdiction abolished once and
for all, it would be possible.
One explanation could be that Justice Brennan believed that service of pro-
cess in the forum somehow enhances the significance of the defendant's having
traveled there. This explanation, however, is erroneous. The purpose of service
is to provide notice; any suggestion that it has a talismanic capacity to assist in
acquiring jurisdiction is a return to the power theory of Pennoyer v. Neff,14
which Justice Brennan purports to reject completely. 147
If service of process in the forum is not what makes the contact significant,
whether a defendant is served while in the forum state or the moment he sets
143. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212.
144. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2125 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
145. See, eg., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416-18 (1984)
(trips by the defendant corporation's officers and employees to the forum considered as contacts and
rejected as insufficient to confer general jurisdiction); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93
(1978) (defendant had made two brief trips to forum state approximately seventeen years before
attempted assertion of jurisdiction; Court stated that "[t]o hold such temporary visits to a State a
basis for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction over unrelated actions arising in the future would
make a mockery of the limitations on state jurisdiction imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment");
see also Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 518 (1923) (visits by officers of
defendant corporation insufficient to "warrant the inference that the corporation was present within
the jurisdiction").
146. 95 U.S. 714 (1878); see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
("capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice").
147. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2120 (Brennan, ., concurring in judgment) (after Shaffer, "[n]o
longer were we content to limit our jurisdictional analysis to pronouncements that... 'every State
possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory'"
(quoting Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877)).
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foot back in his home state should make no difference. His availment of the
benefits and protection of the forum state would have occurred so recently that
its value as a contact should not have diminished.
If there is indeed no difference between the two scenarios, however, the four
members of Justice Brennan's camp must be amenable to a dramatic alteration
in the significance of the contact of having visited a state. 148 Under the terms of
this alteration, the act of entering a forum would establish a level of contacts
sufficient to support general jurisdiction. The defendant would retain this level
of contact for some unspecified period of time after leaving the forum. 14 9 In
practical terms, the effect of this approach would be transient jurisdiction plus
an additional susceptibility to the jurisdiction of the forum state that would re-
main even after a defendant left the forum state.
The other element on which Justice Brennan relied in finding contact with
the forum state is the notion that an asymmetry arises because a defendant is
guaranteed access to the forum's courts as a plaintiff.150 This too is vulnerable
to attack. Under the privileges and immunities clause of article IV of the United
States Constitution, a state must provide to citizens of other states the same
access to its courts that it provides to its own citizens. 15 1 Therefore, as Justice
Scalia pointed out, this element of Justice Brennan's argument justifies a forum's
assertion over "everyone, whether or not he ever comes to California."' 15 2 In the
concept that a contact arises because a visitor's health and safety are guaranteed
and because he is free to use the forum's roads, an affirmative act of availment is
always present, however negligible the Court traditionally has viewed it under
minimum-contacts analysis. 153 With the "asymmetry" argument, however, no
act of availment arises at all.1 4 Not until the defendant actually files suit in a
forum state's court should this issue become a factor in contacts analysis. In
short, Justice Brennan's approach to the minimum-contacts test seeks to attach
tremendously exaggerated significance to an act that, if treated under the normal
analysis, simply might or might not be evidence of substantial contact with the
forum.
The facts of Burnham do not make its result seem particularly unfair.
Given that the case involved a mother busy raising two young children and an
independent father who apparently can travel across the continent with some
regularity and write it off as a business expense, few will raise cries of outrage on
behalf of Dennis Burnham. Perhaps this reason explains why the Court-
148. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
149. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2117-18 (Justice Scalia argued that the result reached under
Justice Brennan's approach would mean that it would also be possible for California to assert generaljurisdiction by serving process on Dennis Burnham after he returned home, "which we know does
not conform with 'contemporary notions of due process.' ").
150. Id. at 2125 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
151. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
152. Id. at 2117.
153. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
154. The defendant must purposefully avail herself of the forum state's benefits and protections
for "minimum-contacts" to arise. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); supra text
accompanying notes 87-89.
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clearly sympathetic to the practice of transient jurisdiction, but seemingly un-
able to provide a coherent rationale for it-decided to explore the question at
this particular moment. Consider the case, however, if Dennis had moved to
California, leaving his wife and children in New Jersey and if Francie had been
the one served with process while she happened to be in California on some
matter unrelated to her marital situation. The arguments all would have been
the same, but many would have perceived an equivalent result as being arbitrary
and unreasonable because of the personal situations of the litigants.
Not long ago the Court stated that "[tihe Due Process Clause... gives a
degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that
conduct will and will not render them liable to suit." 1 " Continued existence of
transient jurisdiction, whether in the traditional form advocated by Justice
Scalia or in the bizarre kind of minimum-contacts analysis proposed by Justice
Brennan, means that wherever one travels, one may be forced to defend a law-
suit, regardless of where the activity that prompted the claim occurred.
What makes the Court's affirmation of transient jurisdiction most objec-
tionable is that a solution that would not extract a prohibitive cost is immedi-
ately at hand. Minimum-contacts analysis has succeeded for forty-five years in
determining assertions of jurisdiction over absent defendants. Extending this
test to instances where service occurs in the forum state would be simple, just as
Shaffer extended the test to instances where the defendant owns property in the
forum state. Replacing transient jurisdiction with minimum-contacts analysis
would eliminate a bright-line rule and would certainly result in added litigation
over the sufficiency of contacts. Claims of fraudulent inducement into the forum
would no longer burden courts, however. Also, the number of motions either to
dismiss based on forum non conveniens 156 or, in the federal courts, for change of
venue, likely would be reduced.
The simple fact that courts have used minimum-contacts analysis to resolve
non-transient-jurisdiction questions for the past four decades renders unfounded
the prediction that abandoning transient jurisdiction would mean "endless" liti-
gation. 157 Admittedly, as is the case whenever a fact-specific inquiry is substi-
tuted for a rule carved in stone, replacing transient jurisdiction with minimum-
contacts analysis would lead to greater "uncertainty and litigation over the pre-
liminary issue of the forum's competence."' 58 The Shaffer Court, however, ex-
plicitly held that this consequence is acceptable if it will ensure jurisdictional due
process in the form of fairness to defendants:
It might.., be suggested that allowing in rem jurisdiction avoids the
uncertainty inherent in the International Shoe standard .... We be-
lieve, however, that the fairness standard of International Shoe can be
easily applied in the vast majority of cases. Moreover, when the exist-
155. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
156. See Posnak, supra note 5, at 766-67.
157. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2120 (White, J., concurring in part and in judgment).
158. Id. at 2119 (White, J., concurring in part and in judgment).
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ence of jurisdiction in a particular forum under International Shoe is
unclear, the cost of simplifying the litigation by avoiding the jurisdic-
tional question may be the sacrifice of "fair play and substantial jus-
tice." That cost is too high. 15 9
In-forum service of process is an inadequate indicator of contacts between
the defendant and the forum state; moreover, the practice of transient jurisdic-
tion can place unreasonable burdens on defendants arbitrarily. When one con-
siders these criticisms in light of the Court's contacts-oriented due process
model and its repeated emphasis on fairness to defendants in jurisdictional mat-
ters-as well as the role Shaffer plays as a justification for abolishing traditional
but outmoded practices-Burnham makes no sense. It would have been both
simple and consistent for the Court to rule that service of process on a defendant
within a forum is no longer a basis for personal jurisdiction, and that the same
minimum-contacts test now used to evaluate all other jurisdictional assertions
applies also when service occurs in the forum. Unfortunately, the Court instead
chose to issue a pair of contradictory and internally inconsistent rationales that
failed to produce a majority rule. The Burnham Court's schizophrenia undoubt-
edly will leave the status of transient jurisdiction in confusion for years to come.
DOUGLAS A. MAYS
159. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 (1977).
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